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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As this Symposium took place in late 2014, Ebola hysteria was in 
full sway in the United States.1  In September 2014, as the Ebola 
epidemic in West Africa worsened, Director of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention Thomas Freidan warned Congress that it was 
“inevitable” that the Ebola virus would enter the U.S., carried 
unknowingly by a traveler exhibiting no symptoms.2  The prediction was 
realized a short time later, when an Ebola patient was admitted for 
hospital care in Dallas, Texas.3  The traveler from Liberia had no 
symptoms of Ebola before or during his international flights.4  Instead, 
his illness began four days after his arrival in the United States.5 
A “fear factor” played a prominent role in public response to Ebola 
in the United States.  Public health officials noted that few countries are 
better equipped to keep the public safe.  While undeniably catastrophic in 
parts of West Africa, an Ebola epidemic in the U.S. remains extremely 
unlikely.  Scientists worry more about new viruses that easily spread 
through the air, unlike the transmission of Ebola.  Such new viruses, or 
mutations of old ones, could have the global reach and devastation of the 
Spanish influenza in 1918. 
                                                          
            * Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty, Emory University School of Law. 
 1. Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever—a deadly contagious virus originating in western Africa—is 
spread by contact with an infected patient’s blood or other body fluids.  It has a high mortality rate 
with no known cure.  It is not, however, spread through the air, sharply limiting the number of 
persons potentially exposed.  See Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (CDC), http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/index.html (last visited May 25, 2015). 
 2. AFP, Ebola’s Spread to U.S. is ‘Inevitable’ says Health Chief, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 8, 2014, 
2:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11020538/Ebolas-spread-
to-US-is-inevitable-says-health-chief.html. 
 3.  Cases of Ebola Diagnosed in the United States, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/ 
outbreaks/2014-west-africa/united-states-imported-case.html (last updated Dec. 16, 2014).  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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In the United States, media-fed interest in Ebola peaked immediately 
before the 2014 mid-term elections, dropping off markedly thereafter 
when no new U.S. cases appeared.6  Human fear and human reactions 
affect how law is made and how it is enforced.  The infinitesimally small 
risk of an Ebola outbreak in the United States threatens to dominate both 
health policy and the treatment of non-citizens travelling from Ebola-
affected areas. 
The theme of this Symposium—Statelessness and Belonging: 
Perspectives on Human Migration—provides an opportunity to place 
these events in a larger context and to compare two distinct grounds to 
exclude “undesirable” migrants.  For my contribution, I provide some 
observations about the global governance of pandemic disease compared 
to the treatment of migrants with mental illness or disability who pose no 
threat of spreading a disease. 
Sovereign nations may refuse admission to migrants who are either 
physically or mentally ill or disabled.  Nations have commonly preferred 
an ideal class—the physically and mentally healthy—to the 
“undesirable” migrant who is unhealthy or disabled.  Both exclusions are 
traditionally justified as a nation’s prerogative to choose its membership.  
Nations defend exclusionary safeguards by the need to protect their 
citizens against contagions from the outside world.  Immigrants who are 
physically or mentally disabled do not pose the same threat, but they may 
require state services and support, what U.S. immigration law terms a 
“public charge.”  Mental illness is a different category altogether, in that 
public safety may be an issue, in addition to the need for state welfare 
expenditures. 
The comparison is between temporarily banning arrivals from Sierra 
Leone, for example, until the threat of contagion has passed, with long-
standing bans on immigrants who are viewed to pose more enduring 
threats—a complete disqualification on mental health grounds, unrelated 
to the immediate protection of public health.  But these latter 
disqualifications are still rationalized under the rubric of “health 
security” by the need to sustain a general level of mental as well as 
physical health in the public.  Mental health and disability exclusions 
                                                          
 6. Philip Bump, The Main Thing on Voters’ Minds Heading Into Election Day Might Have 
Been Ebola, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/ 
11/07/the-main-thing-on-voters-minds-heading-into-election-day-might-have-been-ebola; see also 
Jessica Firger, Ebola Death Toll Rises in West Africa While Americans’ Interest Wanes, CBS NEWS 
(Jan. 8, 2015, 5:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ebola-death-toll-rises-in-west-africa-while-
us-interest-wanes/ (providing chart comparing the number of Ebola deaths to U.S. Google trends 
based upon “Ebola” searches). 
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focus on individual, socially undesirable characteristics, not the 
communicable disease of the moment.  Response to the threat of 
contagious disease is reactive; response to mental illness is more 
deliberate.  Immigration policy has historically taken the category of 
“communicable disease” into account, just as it does the category of 
“mental illness,” even though the specific diseases (or specific 
identifiable types of mental illness) change over time.  Thus, the 
nineteenth-century world worried about people with cholera or 
tuberculosis,7 and the twenty-first century worries about people with 
Ebola.  But the principle of intercepting migrants with possibly 
contagious diseases remains the same. 
I illustrate these issues by comparing the recent Ebola outbreak with 
the exclusion of immigrants on the basis of mental illness in the United 
States.  A tale of two immigrants, to borrow from Dickens—one whose 
misfortune is physical and fleeting, and one whose misfortune is mental 
and enduring.  Historicizing current law from a U.S. perspective sheds 
light on the enduring view of a polity’s “undesirable” immigrant classes. 
In the United States, the policy rationale for health-based exclusions 
is to secure the public against contagious disease, continuing a policy 
that goes back at least to the cholera epidemics of the nineteenth century.  
Implementation of this policy has often developed one step behind our 
understanding of contagion and prevention.  But health exclusions are 
also designed to secure the nation against dependency for reasons of 
disease, especially with respect to mental illness (again continuing a 
policy that goes back through the earliest regulation of immigration and 
has developed one step, at least, behind our understanding of mental 
illness).  
Ultimately we see health security as a manifestation of sovereignty.  
The nation asserts the right to govern the risks it will take (in handling 
Ebola patients) and the burdens it will assume (in taking on mental health 
dependency).  The fact that neither is fool-proof, in light of the 
asymptomatic but infected traveler, or the mentally ill subject who can 
manage to enter the U.S. undetected, illustrates the limits of sovereign 
authority to shape the citizenry. 
I place this understanding of American policy in an international 
public health context—the World Health Organization and Ebola.  No 
such multinational consideration seems to have been given to mental 
                                                          
 7. See generally CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA YEARS: THE UNITED STATES IN 
1832, 1849, AND 1866 1–9 (2d ed. 1987) (describing epidemics in the United States in the nineteenth 
century). 
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illness, at least in terms of global standards and guidance for admission 
of immigrants who are considered mentally impaired in some way.  
These are preliminary thoughts on an expansive subject; my hope is to 
provide a catalyst for further development. 
II.  GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF CONTAGIOUS DISEASE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF MIGRATION 
Sovereign nations have nearly unconstrained authority to exclude 
and even to deport non-citizens on health-related grounds.  As usually 
stated, the right of exclusion is considered to be an attribute of 
sovereignty and territoriality and is defended as an inherent power 
necessary for the self-preservation of the state.8  In other words, if a 
sovereign “could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to 
the control of another power.”9  Acceptable justifications include public 
safety, security, and public welfare.10  This is true even though some 
treaties create obligations that contradict or limit the unconstrained 
exercise of sovereign rights, namely, the various international human 
rights treaties overseen by the U.N.’s Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights.11 
Traditionally in international law, sovereign nations have exclusive 
authority to control and protect their borders and to exclude non-citizens 
from entry.  As one result, we conceive of the protection of public health 
and welfare as measures of national security from external threats.  When 
threatened by pandemic disease potentially carried by migrants, nations 
reflexively close borders.  These actions worsen the problem in affected 
countries, leading to economic devastation as well as disregard for the 
human rights of non-citizens.12  Migrants who are feared to carry a 
                                                          
 8. See James A. R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 
AM. J. INT’L L. 804, 804 (1983) (challenging the claimed right of exclusion on several grounds).  
The Supreme Court of the United States first endorsed this view in the late nineteenth century.  See 
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2002) (noting 
that, in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court repeatedly asserted the doctrine of inherent 
powers “over immigrants in entry and exclusion proceedings”). 
 9. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889).  
 10. See Nafziger, supra note 8, at 804–05. 
 11. For an overview of related treaties and the role of the U.N.’s Human Rights Commission, 
see International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited 
May 25, 2015). 
 12. A comprehensive examination of health law in the international context is provided in 
Professor Lawrence O. Gostin’s seminal work in this field.  See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, GLOBAL 
HEALTH LAW (2014). 
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contagious disease are subject to travel bans, exclusion at borders, and 
visa suspensions.  If they are stateless, their problems are compounded 
because no nation is obligated to receive them. 
The Ebola outbreak in western Africa exposed weaknesses in 
international law for the protection of migrants.13  Political leaders in 
nations threatened by spread of the disease calculate self-interest ahead 
of any treaty obligations for movement of persons and commercial 
goods.  Nations must balance international trade, health security, and 
human rights, with non-citizen migrants ending up on the far edge of the 
balance.  The recent experience with the 2014 Ebola outbreak provides 
context for global governance and national regulation of citizenship and 
migration.14  The global public health structure draws upon sources 
different from the traditional principles of sovereign border control as 
well as from a variety of governing bodies, including the World Bank 
and the World Trade Organization in addition to the World Health 
Organization. 
A. Containing the Spread of Ebola 
Control of Ebola and other contagious disease is, first of all, a matter 
of each nation’s quarantine and isolation laws as well as its public health 
infrastructure and capability.  The World Health Organization and U.S. 
health officials have emphasized the need to control the epidemic in 
West Africa as the best defense against further spread to other nations.  
                                                          
 13. For a critique of the global structure in earlier contexts, see Paul Arshagouni, An 
Introduction to Medical Issues Posed by International Health Threats in a Legal Framework, 12 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 199, 201–06 (2004) (SARS), as well as Nancy E. Allin, The AIDS Pandemic: 
International Travel and Immigration Restrictions and the World Health Organization’s Response, 
28 VA. J. INT’L L. 1043, 1045 (1988) (HIV/AIDS). 
 14. Persons seeking asylum, those who are stateless, and refugee populations present a different 
set of legal issues and rights as a specially protected class.  For example, the U.N. High Commission 
on Refugees includes health directives for refugee populations, which countries typically accept as a 
group.  For refugee populations, the U.S. provides health screening prior to entry.  These issues are 
beyond the scope of this article, but are of great interest to scholars.  See, e.g., Eleanor Acer & Jake 
Goodman, Reaffirming Rights: Human Rights Protections of Migrants, Asylum Seekers, and 
Refugees in Immigration Detention, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 507, 507 (2010) (describing “an 
increasingly acute need for States and the international community to devote greater attention and 
commitment to upholding the human rights of migrants”); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], 
Health of Migrants—The Way Forward: Report of a Global Consultation (Mar. 3–5, 2010), 
http://www.who.int/hac/events/consultation_report_health_migrants_colour_web.pdf; Patricia C. 
Gunn, Health Care Refugees, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 339, 339 (2009) (urging developed 
nations to “consider giving special humanitarian protection to a new class of refugees: the ‘health 
care refugee.’”). 
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Experts agree that low isolation and treatment capability in the most 
affected nations has slowed containment of the disease.15 
In unprecedented action, the United Nations Security Council 
characterized the Ebola outbreak as a “threat to international peace and 
security” and called on Member States to lift travel and border 
restrictions.16  The United Nations (U.N.) also established the first-ever 
emergency health mission, the U.N. Mission for Ebola Emergency 
Response (UNMEER), after the unanimous adoption of General 
Assembly and Security Council resolutions.17  The only other time that 
the U.N. Security Council addressed infectious disease was a 2011 
resolution concerning HIV/AIDS.18 
The transfer in September of two patients from Liberia to Emory 
University Hospital in Atlanta, Georgia, marked the first time the disease 
entered U.S. territory.19  Some public reaction was decidedly negative, 
including bomb threats in response to the hospital’s decision to accept 
the patients.20  Subsequently, several other medical workers infected with 
Ebola were evacuated from West Africa for treatment in the U.S.  To 
date, none of the many health and transport workers involved with these 
planned medical evacuations developed symptoms of Ebola. 
In the case of Ebola, the potential incubation period is up to 21 days 
after exposure to an infected person’s body fluids, and there is as yet no 
test to predict whether a person exposed to the disease will go on to 
develop symptoms.21  Surveillance, screening and contact tracing are 
critical to the containment of any contagious disease.  These public 
health tools are employed to trace contacts of persons who may have 
                                                          
 15. Adam Nossiter, Lax Quarantine Undercuts Ebola Fight in Africa, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/world/africa/lax-quarantine-undercuts-ebola-fight-in-af 
rica.html. 
 16. See Gian Luca Burci & Jakob Quirin, Ebola, WHO, and the United Nations: Convergence 
of Global Public Health and International Peace and Security, 18 ASIL INSIGHTS 25 (2014), 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/25/ebola-who-and-united-nations-convergence-global-
public-health-and. 
 17. See Press Release, Security Council, With Spread of Ebola Outpacing Response, Security 
Council Adopts Resolution 2177 (2014) Urging Immediate Action, End to Isolation of Affected 
States, U.N. Press Release SC/11566 (Sept. 18, 2014), available at http://www.un.org/ 
press/en/2014/sc11566.doc.htm. 
 18. S.C. Res. 1983, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1983 (June 7, 2011), http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/ 
files/sub_landing/files/20110607_UNSC-Resolution1983.pdf. 
 19. See Polly J. Price, Ebola and the Law in the United States: A Short Guide to Public Health 
Authority and Practical Limits, Emory Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-299 (Dec. 14, 2014), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538187. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease), Diagnosis, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/ 
diagnosis/index.html (last visited May 25, 2015). 
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been exposed to contagious disease.  Health officials investigate personal 
contacts and identify others who may have been exposed in transit and 
during medical treatment.  These persons are notified of potential 
exposure, provided with information and health resources, and, as 
appropriate, are quarantined or monitored for symptoms of the disease.22  
Cross-border coordination is especially difficult. 
Following the Ebola outbreak, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) turned its attention to border management in public 
health emergencies that threaten the well-being of migrants.23  As a 
starting point, the organization planned “to step up its support for 
building cross-border public health capacity and safe migration systems 
in West Africa to contain Ebola and other infectious diseases.”24  This 
capacity is essential to migrant health as it also facilitates movement 
across national borders: 
[T]raditional verification of medical records, history of risk exposure, 
and the detection of symptoms is insufficient, when informal cross-
border trade, transnational communities, and porous borders exist . . . . 
Regional human mobility can perpetuate cross-border transmission, 
while at the same time the reopening of borders is essential for the 
resilience and eventual economic recovery of the affected countries.  
IOM’s approach to health and border management . . .aims to step up 
the prevention, detection and response to infectious diseases at points 
of origin, transit, destination and return.25 
The public health practices IOM aims to strengthen are among the 
most difficult to accomplish in the context of immigration: 
“[V]erification of medical records, history of risk exposure, and the 
detection of symptoms is insufficient, when informal cross-border trade, 
transnational communities, and porous borders exist.”26 
An underlying problem is that there is no “right to travel” between 
nations, and no state or international organization must insure that an 
unhealthy migrant can move from place to place.  Realistically, 
                                                          
 22. Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola Virus 
Exposure, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/monitoring-and-movement.pdf (last updated Dec. 
24, 2014).  
 23. See IOM Builds Public Health, Border Management Capacity in Ebola-Impacted Region, 
INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-
views/press-briefing-notes/pbn-2015/pbn-listing/iom-builds-public-health-border.html. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.; see also Polly J. Price, Citizenship, Sovereignty, and the Protection of Public Health, 17 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2014) (detailing cross-border public health control 
measures in the context of immigration at the U.S.-Mexico border). 
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protecting migrant health relies on diplomacy and cooperation along with 
the assistance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and public-
private partnerships.  This diplomatic role and the coordination of aid 
and intervention is the primary function of the World Health 
Organization.27  A brief overview of the World Health Organization’s 
mandate and capabilities provides context for the admission of non-
citizens across national boundaries. 
B.  The World Health Organization, Travel Restrictions, and Border 
Closures 
Global governance of disease is a directive of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), based in Geneva.  On August 8, 2014, WHO 
declared the Ebola outbreak in western Africa to be an international 
public health emergency.28  This meant that the International Health 
Regulations (IHR), adopted in 2007 to address significant contagious 
disease, apply to political, diplomatic, and trade relationships among 194 
countries across the globe, including all the Member States of WHO, in 
the context of matters affecting or affected by Ebola.29  The IHR are 
designed “to help the international community prevent and respond to 
acute public health risks that have the potential to cross borders and 
threaten people worldwide.”30  This action is only the third time WHO 
has declared a global health emergency.31 
What response is required when WHO declares a “public health 
emergency of international concern,” the triggering language for 
application of the IHR?  Primarily, the IHR provide a framework for 
global response designed to strengthen international public health 
security.  WHO issues recommendations that include recommended 
treatment and containment measures for the nations most affected by an 
                                                          
 27. For a discussion of global governance and the protection of human rights, see Maryam 
Zarnegar Deloffre, Human Security in the Age of Ebola: Towards People-Centered Global 
Governance, E-INT’L RELATIONS (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/25/human-security-
in-the-age-of-ebola-towards-people-centered-global-governance. 
 28. Six Months After the Ebola Outbreak was Declared: What Happens When a Deadly Virus 
Hits the Destitute?, WHO, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/ebola-6-months/en/ (last visited 
May 25, 2015). 
 29. Frequently Asked Questions about the International Health Regulations (2005), WHO, 
http://www.who.int/ihr/about/FAQ2009.pdf. 
 30.  International Health Regulations, WHO, http://www.who.int/topics/international_health_ 
regulations/en/. 
 31. Alan Cowell & Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Agency Calls Ebola Outbreak an International 
Health Emergency, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/world/africa/ 
who-declares-ebola-in-west-africa-a-health-emergency.html. 
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outbreak as well as by other threatened states.  Recommended measures 
could be directed toward persons, cargo, ships, aircraft, road vehicles, 
and commercial goods. 
In past outbreaks, WHO has recommended some travel restrictions, 
as was the case in 2009 with H1N1 influenza.32  But many nations 
prohibited any incoming travel from affected countries, revealing the 
weakness of international law with respect to WHO’s mandate.  
Although WHO’s recommendations for the Ebola outbreak did not 
include international travel restrictions to and from the affected regions, 
the declaration urged all nations where the disease is spreading to 
“screen all people leaving at international airports, seaports and land 
crossings, and to prevent travel by anyone suspected of having the Ebola 
virus.”33 
WHO’s recommended guidance included the following: 
Where extraordinary supplemental measures such as quarantine are 
considered necessary in States with intense and widespread 
transmission, States should ensure that they are proportionate and 
evidence-based, and that accurate information, essential services and 
commodities, including food and water, are provided to the affected 
populations.34 
WHO also stated: 
Flight cancellations and other travel restrictions continue to isolate 
affected countries resulting in detrimental economic consequences, and 
hinder relief and response efforts risking further international spread of 
the disease; the Committee strongly reiterated that there should be no 
general ban on international travel or trade, except for the restrictions 
outlined in the previous recommendations regarding the travel of EVD 
[Ebola Virus Disease] cases and contacts.35 
WHO declared that there should be no international travel of persons 
with Ebola or those in close contact with them, unless the travel is part of 
an “appropriate medical evacuation.”36  The balance is a precarious one.  
                                                          
 32. See Rebecca Katz, Use of Revised International Health Regulations during Influenza A 
(H1N1) Epidemic, 2009, 15 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1165, 1168 (Aug. 2009), http://www 
nc.cdc.gov/eid/article/15/8/pdfs/09-0665.pdf. 
 33.  Cowell & Cumming-Bruce, supra note 31. 
 34.  Statement on the 2nd Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014 Ebola 
Outbreak in West Africa, WHO (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/state 
ments/2014/ebola-2nd-ihr-meeting/en/. 
 35.  Id. 
 36. See id. 
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On the one hand, WHO calls for preventing afflicted persons from 
traveling; on the other hand, they implore against flight cancellations and 
other travel restrictions.  The underlying point is that restrictions should 
be applied only to people suffering from the disease, or likely carriers, 
and not to regions or nations as a whole. 
Most critically, WHO warned against “geographic quarantine”—
sealing off a location to prevent people from leaving that area.  A 
geographic quarantine might be used, for example, to separate a group of 
persons who may have been exposed to a disease until it can be 
determined that they are not ill.  Both geographic quarantines and border 
closings occurred anyway.  As reported in Liberia, the attempt to cordon 
off a large slum in the capital led to panic and violent repression of 
persons trying to escape.37  Residents, understandably, believed that the 
government had imposed a death sentence on them.  In addition, five 
African countries shut their borders with each other, further hampering 
international aid. 
WHO admitted shortcomings in its initial response to Ebola, based in 
part on its governance structure and lack of funds.  Lessons learned led to 
a number of reform measures within WHO.38  Although these measures 
will not insure compliance of nations with the IHR, WHO will improve 
its response capacity as well as maintain a contingency fund for future 
public health emergencies.39  But WHO also stressed “the importance of 
evidence-based responses and community engagement to prevent fear, 
stigma and discrimination,” and it reaffirmed “the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of 
every human being.”40 
WHO Member States agreed upon the IHR by consensus as a 
balance between their sovereign rights and a shared commitment to 
prevent the international spread of disease.  Although the IHR do not 
include an enforcement mechanism for States that fail to comply with 
WHO recommendations, the potential consequences of non-compliance 
                                                          
 37. Norimitsu Onishi, Quarantine for Ebola Lifted in Liberia Slum, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/world/africa/quarantine-for-ebola-lifted-in-liberia-slum. 
html?_r=0. 
 38. See Stephanie Nebehey, After Ebola, WHO to Set Up Contingency Fund, Develop “Surge 
Capacity,” REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2015, 3:33 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/27/us-health-
ebola-who-idUSKBN0L02M020150127. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Ebola: Ending the Current Outbreak, Strengthening Global Preparedness and Ensuring 
WHO Capacity to Prepare for and Respond to Future Large-Scale Outbreaks and Emergencies with 
Health Consequences, WHO, ¶ PP2, ¶ PP3 (Jan. 25, 2015), http://apps.who.int/ 
gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EBSS3/EBSS3_CONF1Rev1-en.pdf. 
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are themselves a powerful tool.  These consequences may include a 
tarnished international image, increased morbidity/mortality in affected 
populations, unilateral travel and trade restrictions by other nations, and 
economic and social disruption.  Working with WHO to control a public 
health event such as Ebola can help prevent reflexive, unnecessary, and 
counter-productive border closings and economic disruption.41 
Thus, “law” as we traditionally view it does not control how nations 
deal with each other in the event of a pandemic health threat.  The IHR, 
however, are binding on Member States, even as they emphasize 
coordination and voluntary cooperation.42  The aim is to avoid over-
reactions that could have severe humanitarian consequences.  But there is 
no coercion to direct at noncompliant states in the legal sense—the real 
bargaining tools are incentives, diplomacy, and most importantly 
perhaps, money.  How nations react to the threat of pandemic disease, 
then, is never solely about science, but what has been termed “disease 
diplomacy.”43 
C.  Mental Illness is Different? 
Sovereignty, citizenship, and migration in relation to public health 
are most commonly linked to contagious disease.  The recent experience 
with Ebola underscores broader points about the treatment of non-
citizens attempting to cross borders in other situations, including fleeing 
from armed conflict and natural disasters.44 
In comparison with the threat of contagious disease as a reason to 
reject an applicant for admission across a national border, mental health 
disability exclusions are different in several respects.  Unlike migration 
in public health emergencies, there is no international governing body to 
address discrimination against migrants who suffer from psychiatric 
disorders or limited mental capacity.45  Migration itself is stressful, of 
                                                          
 41. See GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 89–128. 
 42. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 43. See David P. Fidler, The Return of “Microbialpolitik”: As Infectious Diseases Become a 
Global Threat, Policymakers Relearn an Old Lesson, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 20, 2009), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/20/the-return-of-microbialpolitik. 
 44. See generally Sanjula Weerasinghe et al., On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries 
Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster, 3 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 26 (2015), available 
at http://jmhs.cmsny.org/index.php/jmhs/article/view/42 (discussing the hardships of non-citizens 
caught in disaster or conflict).  
 45. For an overview of mental health law in a global context, see Lawrence O. Gostin & Lance 
Gable, The Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the 
Application of Human Rights Principles to Mental Health, 63 MD. L. REV. 20 (2004). 
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course, and can lead to mental disorders.46  Historically and today, 
nations have excluded immigrants with mental illness or disability, 
making sound mental health a formal requirement of immigration law.47 
Distinguishing the “desirable” from the “undesirable” immigrant is 
expressed in many ways and in many countries.  As a general rule, 
western nations prefer educated professionals and persons with skills to 
fill employment needs.  Canada, for example, recently amended its 
immigration laws to prioritize skilled workers and individual investors.48  
The United States also privileges education and wealth.  These policies 
contribute to a global “brain drain” from poor to rich countries.49 
The opposite of the brain drain phenomenon is exclusion of migrants 
based upon mental capacity or psychiatric disorders.  I examine these 
more fully in the context of the United States. At this point, however, it 
is useful to glance at international norms specific to the treatment of 
migrants with psychiatric disorders and mental disability, considered 
from a human rights perspective to be among the groups most 
discriminated against.50 
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has included the 
treatment of disabled persons as part of its mission for several decades.51  
With respect to mental disability, the Commission identifies mentally ill 
persons as “particularly vulnerable,” and outlines specific measures 
states should employ to protect them.52  But these goals apply only to 
persons already within a nation’s boundaries.  No guidance, statement of 
best practices, or international norms applies to the decision to admit. 
                                                          
 46. See Dinesh Bugra & Peter Jones, Migration and Mental Illness, 7 ADVANCES IN 
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 216, 216 (2001). 
 47. See, e.g., The Multi-Ethnic Association for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities, 
NGO Quebec—Canada, Disability + Immigration: A New Planetary Reality (presented at the U.N. 
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance 
(WCAR), Durban, South Africa, September 2001), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ 
ahc5docs/ahc5multiethnic.doc (providing examples from various countries). 
 48. See Susan Mas, 60 Millionaire Immigrant Investors to be Offered Permanent Residency, 
CBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2015, 11:27 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/60-millionaire-immigrant-
investors-to-be-offered-permanent-residency-1.2932616; Stephanie Levitz, Canada’s New ‘Express 
Entry’ Immigration System Coming in 2015, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2015, 5:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/12/30/canada-express-entry-immigration_n_6397294.html. 
 49. See Anup Shah, Brain Drain of Workers from Poor to Rich Countries, GLOBAL ISSUES 
(April 14, 2006), http://www.globalissues.org/article/599/brain-drain-of-workers-from-poor-to-rich-
countries. 
 50. See Leandro Despouy, Human Rights and Disabled Persons, UNITED NATIONS SUB-
COMM’N ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROT. OF MINORITIES ¶ 193, 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/dispaperdes0.htm (last visited May 25, 2015).  
 51.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
 52. Id. at ¶¶ 193–94, 200–03.  
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A 1989 report commissioned by the U.N. emphasizes how mentally 
disabled persons should be treated within member nations.53  Exclusion 
of mentally ill migrants, however, remains within national prerogative, 
even as nations are urged to consider restrictive immigration practices 
within the framework of human rights: 
In the legal sphere . . . many instances of discrimination can be found in 
immigration laws.  Many national laws prevent mentally handicapped 
persons from entering the country, not only as permanent residents, but 
even as tourists, for a limited period of time.  Attention is drawn to the 
fact that it is in the most developed Western countries (Canada, France, 
Switzerland, United States) that this type of restrictive legislation is 
most frequently applied on the grounds, in many cases, that the 
presence of mentally handicapped persons from abroad will impose 
“excessive demands on health or social services.”54 
In addition, in 1982 the U.N. General Assembly approved a “World 
Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons.”55  The focus of this 
resolution, as well, centered on treatment of disabled persons within 
national borders: “The World Programme of Action (WPA) is a global 
strategy to enhance disability prevention, rehabilitation and equalization 
of opportunities, which pertains to full participation of persons with 
disabilities in social life and national development.”56 
Regional treaties also address human rights of disabled persons, 
including those disabled by mental disease.  The European Convention 
for Human Rights, for example, expressly protects mentally impaired 
persons in several provisions, and the European Court of Human Rights 
has extensive case-law developing these mental health protections.57  The 
court recently provided a fact sheet specifically devoted to mental health, 
describing relevant provisions of the Convention and the court’s 
decisions.58 
A central provision of the European Convention for Human Rights, 
however, also illustrates the conflation of contagious disease and mental 
illness as threats to the public: 
                                                          
 53. Id. at ¶ 194. 
 54. Id. 
 55. G.A. Res. 37/52, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (Dec. 3, 1982), 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=23. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Gostin & Gable, supra note 45, at 57. 
 58. European Court of Human Rights, Fact Sheet—Mental Health (May 2013), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Mental_health_ENG.pdf. 
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Article 5 § 1: Right to liberty and security 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.  No one shall 
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law: 
. . . 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading 
of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug 
addicts or vagrants.59 
“Unsound mind,” according to the court, is a term that cannot “be 
given a definitive interpretation: . . . it is a term whose meaning is 
continually evolving as research in psychiatry progresses, an increasing 
flexibility in treatment is developing and society’s attitude to mental 
illness changes . . . “, citing the language from a 1979 decision.60  This 
flexibility and evolution suggest that the “mental illness” category is not 
any more fixed and unchanging than the “contagious disease” category, 
where the label on the disorder may vary but the principles by which the 
sufferer is handled do not. 
Mental health rights in the Americas are also recognized and 
supported through the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights61 as 
well as the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), a regional office 
of the World Health Organization.62  PAHO initiated the Caracas 
Declaration of 1990, which committed nations to improve mental health 
services and policies and to safeguard human rights in the region.63  
Endorsed by all countries of the Americas, the Caracas Declaration 
aimed to improve mental health care through the replacement of the 
service model based on the psychiatric hospital with community 
alternatives of care, and through actions to safeguard the human rights of 
persons affected by mental disorders.64  The Caracas Declaration has 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 3. 
 60. Winterwerp v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Application no. 6301/73) (1979), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57597. 
 61. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ORG. OF AMER. STATES, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited May 25, 2015). 
 62. See About PAHO, PAN AMER. HEALTH ORG., http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=220&lang=en (last visited May 25, 2015). 
 63. The text of the Caracas Declaration is available at Mental Health Project, Mandates and 
Declarations, PAN AMER. HEALTH ORG., http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=category&layout=blog&id=1167&Itemid=938 (last visited May 25, 2015). 
 64. See The Brazilia Principles, PAN AMER. HEALTH ORG., available at 
http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=544&Itemid= 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
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been used by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
(IACHR) as a standard of interpretation of the American Convention on 
Human Rights and other legal instruments.65 
In 2009, PAHO adopted a ten-year “Strategy and Plan of Action on 
Mental Health.”66 The document generally focuses on the following 
“principles and values:” 
a) Universality, access, and inclusion. 
b) Equity in mental health. 
c) Pan American solidarity, understood as collaboration among 
countries. 
d) Respect for the fundamental human rights of people with mental 
disorders. 
. . . 
f ) Use of the best available scientific evidence. 
g) Additional protection on mental health matters for vulnerable 
groups. 
. . . 
i) Mental health as a component of comprehensive health care.67 
PAHO’s Mental Health Project is housed in the 
organization’s Department of Non-communicable Diseases and Mental 
Health, with the mission to promote and coordinate activities to 
strengthen the mental health systems of nations in the Americas.68 
Despite substantial global attention to mental health issues, led by 
WHO and regional agencies, none of the directives or resolutions 
addresses a nation’s decision to exclude non-citizens on mental health 
                                                          
 65. Id. 
 66. Newsletter, Strategy and Plan of Action on Mental Health, PAN AMER. HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.paho.org/bulletins/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=604:strategy-and-
plan-of-action-on-mental-health&Itemid=0&lang=en (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
 67. Framework for the Implementation of the Regional Strategy for Mental Health, PAN AMER. 
HEALTH ORG. 5–9 (2011), http://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/FRAMEWORK%20Mental 
%20Health%20Panama.pdf?ua=1 (last visited May 25, 2015). 
 68. Mental Health Project, PAN AMER. HEALTH ORG., http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=1167&Itemid=938 (last visited May 25, 
2015). 
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grounds, and migration is not considered a fundamental human right. 
(Conversely, nations do not categorically limit the departure of the 
mentally ill or disabled.) Global governance and international norms aim 
to protect disabled and mentally ill persons within national borders, 
including refugee populations, but do not include individual migrants 
seeking admission to a particular nation.  The contrast with world 
governance structures directed toward contagious diseases, such as 
Ebola, is one of urgency or expediency rather than principle.  To 
illustrate these points in a concrete way, I turn now to immigration laws 
and practices of the United States. 
III. NON-CONTAGIOUS HEALTH CONDITIONS: PSYCHIATRIC CRITERIA IN 
U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW 
Over the course of the twentieth century (and continuing today), 
immigrant health-based exclusions in the United States were linked to 
poverty and the likelihood that a non-citizen might become a public 
charge.  As is the case in many other developed nations, health-based 
exclusions have been part of U.S. immigration law for over a century.69  
These immigration restrictions served two functions: preventing 
importation of disease, and weeding out “undesirables.”70 
At several points in U.S. history, immigrants have been publicly 
identified as a source of contagious disease.71  There are a number of 
excellent scholarly works elucidating public perception of immigrants 
and contagious disease in the United States.72  Some have also addressed 
disability, including mental capacity—most notably Mark Weber’s 
recent work on disability in U.S. immigration law.73  But psychiatric 
disorders merit separate consideration because, like contagious disease, 
                                                          
 69. See Immigration Act of 1891, Ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084 (1891) (permitting the exclusion 
of foreign nationals on the basis of health or communicable disease and other characteristics). 
 70. See generally Jennifer M. Chaćon, The Mercer Girls Guide to Immigration 64 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 15, 18 (2011) (noting the lengthy history of immigrant exclusions based on 
undesirable group characteristics). 
 71. See, e.g., Felice Batlan, Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and 
Quarantines Past and Future, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 62 (2007) (documenting response to cholera 
outbreaks). 
 72. See, e.g., ALAN KRAUT, SILENT TRAVELERS: GERMS AND THE IMMIGRANT MENACE (1995); 
Howard Markel & Alexandra Minna Stern, Which Face? Whose Nation?, 42 AMER. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 1314 (1999); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-
1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).  
 73. Mark C. Weber, Opening the Golden Door: Disability and the Law of Immigration, 8 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 153 (2004).  See also Douglas C. Baynton, Defectives in the Land: 
Disability and American Immigration Policy, 1882-1924, 24 J. AMER. ETHNIC HIST. 31 (2005) 
(discussing early immigration policy with regard to mental incapacity). 
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perception of a threat to the public has tended to predominate over 
considerations of individual capacity.74  Mental health and capacity are 
like exclusions for criminals in this respect—historically, mental illness 
has been treated as a prediction of future threats to public safety, a less 
immediate threat than that of an imminent epidemic.  These exclusions 
are also a prediction about the demand on social services to treat 
individuals. 
I am not concerned here with the many current issues with respect to 
disability and U.S. immigration law, including due process concerns and 
the provision of counsel in removal proceedings for mentally disabled 
migrants.75  These issues, along with refugee health, are of critical 
importance but are beyond the scope of the points I wish to make. 
A.  The Long History of Mental Health Exclusions 
The history of health-based exclusions in the U.S. is not entirely new 
terrain.  Particularly well covered in the historiography are the 
banishment of homosexuals, prostitutes, and the use of physical 
characteristics to exclude ethnic and racial groups, as well as the 
exclusion of persons based upon political belief.76  My purpose here is 
not to revisit this scholarship, but to contrast exclusion for contagious 
disease (the historical equivalents of Ebola) with non-contagious 
conditions.  Today, we view many practices excluding immigrants to 
have been strikingly discriminatory,77 but exclusions directed to mental 
health and capacity are not viewed this way. 
Local governments in the original thirteen states, and those that 
followed, routinely turned away nonresidents who were poor or disabled, 
including those with mental disabilities who were unable to support 
themselves.78  Excluding immigrants who may become a “public charge” 
                                                          
 74. For commentary on current law excluding non-citizens based on danger posed by mental 
disorder, see Jennifer Blakeman, The Exclusion of Mentally Ill Aliens Who May Pose A Danger to 
Others: Where Does the Real Threat Lie?, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 287 (2000). 
 75. See, e.g., Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices: The Due-Process Rights of Mentally 
Disabled Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373 (2011). 
 76. See, e.g., DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
(2007); Hiroshi Motomura, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006), at 21–24, 39–40, and sources cited therein; Carol Leslie 
Wolchok, Aids at the Frontier: United States Immigration Policy, 10 J. LEGAL MED. 127, 128 
(1989) (detailing U.S. history of excluding immigrants based on “‘undesirable’ medical infirmities 
or disabilities”). 
 77. See, e.g., Samuel M. Silvers, The Exclusion and Expulsion of Homosexual Aliens, 15 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 295 (1984). 
 78. See Baynton, supra note 73, at 32; William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the 
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has been a consistent feature of law in the U.S., and remains a ground of 
exclusion today.79 
The U.S. Public Health Service, created by Congress in 1912 as a 
renamed version of the earlier Marine Hospital Service,80 had as its 
primary mission to prevent contagious diseases from entering the country 
via immigration and trade.81  Historically, state and local health 
authorities held complete inspection and quarantine authority at ports of 
entry and border crossings.82  Passengers and crew entering these ports 
were subject to detention for “suspicious sickness” on board or at the 
point of landing.83  Refusing entry to foreign ships—with passengers and 
crew—could be effected on the authority of a state or local health 
official.84  In modern practice, the federal Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention has been tasked with the designation of “communicable 
disease[s] of public health significance,” and the U.S. Public Health 
Service provides screening at ports of entry.85 
Legislation by Congress permitting the exclusion of aliens on the 
basis of health or communicable disease dates back to the Immigration 
Act of 1891.86  “Persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous 
contagious disease” were added to the grounds of exclusion, and the 
1891 Act also required a medical inspection of all aliens arriving at ports 
of entry.87  Other features of the law prohibited the immigration of 
“idiots” and “lunatics.”88  When the various immigration and citizenship 
                                                          
Original Thirteen States, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 111–12 (1997) (“Assistance . . . was strictly 
rationed to those local residents considered worthy of help. Visitors, strangers and nonresident poor 
people were not helped and were legally run out of town.”). 
 79. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) (2013) 
[hereinafter I.N.A.].  See also Neuman, supra note 72, at 1846–48 (describing poverty exclusions by 
state and local governments); Leo M. Alpert, The Alien and the Public Charge Clauses, 49 YALE L. 
J. 18 (1939) (providing historical context for “persons likely to become a public charge”). 
 80. Act of Aug. 14, 1912, ch. 288, 37 Stat. 309 (repealed 1944).  The U.S. Public Health 
Service was authorized in 1912, among other tasks, to “study and investigate the diseases of man and 
conditions influencing the propagation and spread thereof . . . and . . . issue information in the form 
of publications for the use of the public.”  Id. § 1, 37 Stat. at 309. 
 81. MARGARET HUMPHREYS, YELLOW FEVER AND THE SOUTH 69 (1992). 
 82. See Margaret Warner, Local Control Versus National Interest: The Debate over Southern 
Public Health,1878–1884, 50 J. S. HIST. 407, 407–08 (1984). 
 83. See Treasury Department, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERVISING SURGEON GENERAL 
1681, available at https://archive.org/stream/annualreportofsu1901unit#page/10/mode/2up. 
 84. See Warner, supra note 82, at 407–08. 
 85. History of Quarantine, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/HistoryQuarantine.html (last 
updated July 31, 2014). 
 86. 1891 Immigration Act, ch. 554, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891), available at 
library.uwb.edu/guides/usimmigration/26%20stat%201084.pdf. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  
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laws were unified and codified as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 (INA), the health-related grounds were seven of 31 grounds for 
exclusion.89 
Today, one of the reasons why a foreign national might be deemed 
inadmissible is on health-related grounds.  Currently, “foreign nationals 
not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the 
United States generally must obtain a visa and submit to [a health] 
inspection to be admitted.”90 
The modern iteration excludes persons with a “communicable 
disease of public health significance,” as detailed in regulations 
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services.91  
Persons with “physical or mental disorders” may also be excluded, if 
they are adjudged: 
1. [T]o have a physical or mental disorder and behavior associated with 
the disorder that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the property, safety, 
or welfare of the alien or others, or 
2. [T]o have had a physical or mental disorder and a history of behavior 
associated with the disorder, which behavior has posed a threat to the 
property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others and which behavior is 
likely to recur or to lead to other harmful behavior.92 
Mental disorder as a disqualification for entering the U.S., and 
accordingly disqualification for U.S. citizenship, has a long history, 
points of which are noted below.  So, too, the public perception of 
classes of immigrants considered “undesirable.”  A Senate report in 1950 
concluded that foreign-born persons had higher rates of mental disease 
than the native population.93  There is ample evidence that this was a 
                                                          
 89. Ruth Ellen Wasem, Immigration Policies and Issues on Health-Related Grounds for 
Exclusion, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, at 2 (2014), available at http://www.fas 
.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R40570.pdf. 
 90. Id. at 1. 
 91. I.N.A. § 212(a)(1)(A)(i).  The Department of Health and Human Services regulations at 42 
CFR § 34.2(b) define the term “communicable disease of public health significance” as including: 
(a) chancroid; (b) gonorrhea; (c) granuloma inguinale; (d) human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
infection; (e) leprosy, infectious; (f) lymphogranuloma venereum; (g) syphilis, infectious stage; and 
(h) tuberculosis, active.  The CDC recently updated its Mental Health Technical Instructions used for 
diagnosis in immigration matters.  See Technical Instructions for Civil Surgeons and Panel 
Physicians, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/immigrantrefugeehealth/exams/ti/faq-physical-mental-disor 
ders-technical-instructions.html (last updated Dec. 5, 2013). 
 92. I.N.A. § 212(a)(1)(A)(iii) (formerly I.N.A. § 212(a)(1)(A)(ii)). 
 93. S. Rep. 81-1515, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 81ST CONG., REP. ON IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES (April 20, 1950), reprinted in OSCAR M. 
TRELLES AND JAMES F. BAILEY, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACTS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES 
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long-standing public belief, beginning with the first large waves of 
immigration in the latter nineteenth century. 
I offer two brief observations before exploring this history further.  
First, immigrant health exclusions codified in federal legislation were not 
driven purely by public health concerns. Second, Congressional control 
of health-based exclusion categories sometimes bore no relationship to 
the scientific medical learning of the day.  In the psychiatric field, 
reliance on agency implementation has been problematic, even as 
medical understanding of psychiatric disorders has changed over time. 
B.  Immigrants and the Asylum, a Question of Who Pays 
State-run asylums for the mentally ill originated in the nineteenth 
century.  There are many excellent histories of these institutions, usually 
with a focus on abusive treatment and the “warehouse” role to confine 
and segregate the mentally ill and disabled from the rest of society.94 
Until the great waves of migration of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, foreign birth was noted for asylum inmates but 
otherwise raised no concern for reimbursement for indigent non-citizens.  
One of the earliest and largest of such institutions was the Georgia State 
Lunatic, Idiot, and Epileptic Asylum, opened in 1842 and later named the 
Georgia State Sanitarium and the Milledgeville State Hospital.95  The 
asylum accepted both “pay” patients and paupers “sent here in 
conformity with the requisitions of the law.”96  The asylum accepted 
patients regardless of nationality, although patient records usually noted 
the country of birth if not the United States.97  The patients were 
primarily German and Irish,98 reflecting migration patterns at that point 
in Georgia. 
Patient records reveal how asylum medical staff regarded patients, 
especially reflecting the variety of diagnoses and speculation about 
presumed causes of a disorder.  For example: 
                                                          
AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, at 197 (1979–1981).  Text of the Senate Judiciary report is available at 
https://bulk.resource.org/gao.gov/82-414/000022C1.pdf. 
 94. See, e.g., MICHAEL T. KEENE, MAD HOUSE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF INSANE ASYLUMS IN 
19TH-CENTURY NEW YORK (2013); CHRISTOPHER PAYNE AND OLIVER SACKS, ASYLUM: INSIDE THE 
CLOSED WORLD OF STATE MENTAL HOSPITALS (2009). 
 95. See PETER G. CRANFORD, BUT FOR THE GRACE OF GOD: MILLEDGEVILLE! (1981). 
 96. PAUL K. GRAHAM, ADMISSION REGISTER OF CENTRAL STATE HOSPITAL, MILLEDGEVILLE, 
GEORGIA, 1842–1861 (2011). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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Caleb Wilkerson, pauper, lunatic from Troup County, age 49, single, 
cause of lunacy, disappointed affection, duration 25 or 30 years, 
common laborer, came of his own accord on foot, without clothing to 
conceal his nakedness, shoes or hat, had not eaten more than twice or 
three times while on the road, although he was 5 or 6 days coming.  
Recd. him Feb 29th 1845, gave him clothing &c., & wrote the Justices 
of the Inferior Court of his arrival who promised to have him legally 
committed.  They neglected to do so until the 13th May 1846 at which 
time he was turned out.  He then made application in person to the 
Justices of the Inferior Court of this county for commitment to the 
asylum which commitment was granted 23rd May 1846 at which time 
he was recd. as a pauper.99 
Although foreign birth was often seen as a factor in mental illness, in 
these early asylum cases there is no indication that the institutions 
themselves refused admission to non-citizens, or that they sought 
reimbursement specifically for housing and treating recent immigrants.  
The citizenship of an inmate seems to have been noted for its potential as 
a factor in diagnosis, rather than fear of immigrant traits or significance 
for payment.  One record, for example, links nationality to a suspected 
cause of “insanity”: 
Jacob Keener, pauper patient from Troup County, German, occupation 
cabinet workman, age [blank] years, duration of insanity [blank] years, 
cause unknown except it be an ardent desire to return to Germany with 
inability to do so.100 
Another patient record noted the patient was “an Englishman” but 
did not specify any link to his condition, reportedly that he was “badly 
insane.”101 
This relative lack of concern with immigration status would change 
with growing numbers of immigrants, together with a perception that 
these new immigrants came from inferior stock.  Other nations, some 
                                                          
 99. Id. at 5.  For another example, one patient record stated: “Anderson Quick, pauper, lunatic 
from Fayette County, age 26, single, laborer, insanity caused by solitary confinement, duration 8 
years, was chained to one spot during the whole period, admitted 28th June 1846, died of marasmus 
11th May 1847.”  Id. at 11. 
 100. Id. at 72.  
 101. “John Wade, lunatic, pauper from Savannah, age 36, married, engineer and machinist, 
Englishman, cause of insanity ill health and jealousy, duration two years, admitted 11th April 1844, 
discharged 4th July 1844, on promise that he would leave the state.  He visited several of the western 
states, some of the northern states, and finally went to Savannah.  They supposed there that he had 
escaped from the institution.  He was immediately arrested and returned to the asylum without any 
form of commitment August 26th 1845.  He remained here till the 16th December 1845 at which 
time he made application to the board of trustees for a discharge.  They determined that they had no 
legal right to withhold it and it was granted.  When last heard from he was in Charleston at work in a 
machine shop, still badly insane.”  Id at 2. 
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believed, used America’s liberal immigration policies to rid themselves 
of undesirable persons—the poor, the uneducated, and the physically and 
mentally inferior. 
Beginning in the twentieth century, state governments played a 
limited role in mental health-based exclusions for immigrants, and this 
role was primarily to identify non-citizens for deportation on the ground 
that they had become a “public charge.”  The key for this development 
was the concept of “delayed exclusion” in federal immigration law, 
which allowed deportation of a non-citizen who had been living in the 
United States but who had been “overlooked” in the federal medical 
exam process at the port of entry.102  Initially, delayed exclusion was 
possible after one year of entry; soon the limitation period expanded to 
two years, and finally to five years following entry.103  Once post-hoc 
inadmissibility was possible, it became a common practice for state 
health agencies and hospitals—especially mental health institutions—to 
engineer the deportation of any non-citizen who had become a public 
charge or who had spent even a small amount of time in a mental 
institution.104 
The McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952 continued this 
retroactive exclusion as federal law, providing for the deportation of 
foreign nationals who were excludable at time of entry if they later 
became a public charge or were “persons afflicted with psychopathic 
personality.”105 
The Yale Law Journal examined the mental health ground in 1959 in 
an article entitled “Limitations on Congressional Power to Deport 
Resident Aliens Excludable as Psychopaths at Time of Entry.”106  While 
the article criticized administrative expulsion because of the indefinite 
standard government officials used, it also pointed out that most 
expulsion cases came at the request of state health officials and were 
based solely upon a medical certificate or record of a hospital stay.107 
                                                          
 102. See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 76, at 124–27 (describing development of post-entry 
social controls, including exclusion for crimes committed after entry). 
 103. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND 
POLICY 771–772 (6th ed. 2008). 
 104. See Amy L. Fairchild, Policies of Inclusion: Immigrants, Disease, Dependency, and 
American Immigration Policy at the Dawn and Dusk of the 20th Century, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
528 (2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1448289/pdf/0940528.pdf. 
 105. McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, H.R. 13342, 82nd Cong. (1952) available at http://www-
rohan.sdsu.edu/dept/polsciwb/brianl/docs/1952McCarranWaltersAct.pdf. 
 106. Note, Limitations on Congressional Power to Deport Resident Aliens Excludable as 
Psychopaths at Time of Entry, 68 YALE L. J. 931 (1959). 
 107. Id. 
2015] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 939 
The U.S. Public Health Service frequently relied upon state medical 
evaluations with only a cursory stamp of approval—having never met or 
evaluated the patient—because they lacked the staffing to follow-up 
individual cases.  One example was the case of Mrs. Margarita Leon, a 
patient committed to a state mental hospital in 1951 following an 
altercation in which she struck a bartender with a bottle.108  She was 
found deportable by federal immigration authorities on the ground that 
she was afflicted with “constitutional psychopathic inferiority” at the 
time she entered the country two years earlier.109  The evidence was 
based on a medical certificate and the following history: 
Patient was a problem in childhood, eloped from school with a man at 
age of 15, has had two divorces and has lived without marriage with a 
man for the past nine years, except for brief interval when she married 
and deserted husband.  Described by others as unreliable, untruthful, 
intemperate, quarrelsome, and bad tempered.110 
Mrs. Leon’s story compellingly illustrates the primacy of the state 
role and the acquiescence of federal health and immigration officials.  
Following Mrs. Leon’s two-week involuntary commitment at Bellevue, 
she subsequently was transferred to another New York state mental 
facility where she was a patient for five months.111  During this time New 
York state officials contacted federal immigration authorities, reporting 
that Mrs. Leon was not a citizen and had been diagnosed by them as 
having “psychosis with psychopathic personality; paranoid trends.”112 
As Mrs. Leon’s case wound its way through federal deportation 
proceedings, she sought and obtained an examination by a U.S. Public 
Health Service medical officer.113  That officer concluded that at the time 
of his examination, there was “no evidence of overt psychosis.”114  
Nonetheless, the officer concluded there was “no doubt that the patient 
was properly certified as suffering from constitutional psychopathic 
inferiority at the time of her entry,” meaning she should have been 
certified as mentally unfit five years previously.115  The medical officer’s 
conclusion was based entirely upon mental health records provided by 
                                                          
 108. United States ex rel. Leon v. Murff, 250 F.2d 436, 437 (2d Cir. 1957). 
 109. Id. 
 110. United States ex rel. Leon v. Shaughnessy, 143 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff’d 
sub nom. United States ex rel. Leon v. Murff, 250 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1957). 
 111. Murff, 250 F.2d at 436. 
 112. Shaughnessy, 143 F. Supp. at 271–72. 
 113. Murff, 250 F.2d at 437. 
 114. Id. at 438. 
 115. Id. 
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the state of New York.116  That she came to the attention of federal 
immigration officers at all was entirely at the instance of the hospital’s 
medical staff.117 
While state officials alerted immigration authorities about persons 
excludable for public charge and other health-related grounds, “mental 
defect” seems to have been the most common charge.  It was also quite 
vague and subject to abuse which neither the Public Health Service nor 
the Board of Immigration Appeals was willing to remedy.  As Judge 
Learned Hand wrote in 1959, deportation was legally permitted for 
persons “who by nature were subject to insanity of one sort or another; 
that is to say, whose constitution was such that they had not normal 
mental stability . . . inherent in their nervous structure.”118  Courts, Hand 
wrote, “must accept the opinion of those formally qualified” to make 
such pronouncements.119  “The whole subject is one of excessive 
uncertainty at best; whoever is fitted for the responsibility, it is certain 
that we are not; we must act upon what those tell us who carry the proper 
credentials.”120 
To its discredit, the U.S. Public Health Service adopted the same 
attitude with respect to state certifications of mental disability.121  
Responding to criticisms that “psychopathic personality” was “the most 
disputed and open-ended diagnostic label in the field of psychiatry,”122 
the Public Health Service issued regulations effective in 1948 that 
provided: 
There shall be certified as cases of constitutional psychopathic 
inferiority all psychopathic characters such as “chronic litigants,” 
“sexual perverts,” “pathological liars,” “dipsomaniacs,” “moral 
imbeciles” and mentally peculiar persons who because of eccentric 
behavior, defective judgment, or abnormal impulses are in repeated 
conflict with social customs and constituted authorities.123 
                                                          
 116. Id. at 437–39. 
 117. Id. 
 118. United States ex rel. Powlowec v. Day, 33 F.2d 267, 268 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. One historian claims that U.S. P.H.S. physicians refused to sit on these “Boards of Special 
Inquiry,” as an explanation for the fact physicians did not participate in final decisions to admit or 
deport.  See Alan M. Kraut, Germs, Genes, and American Efficiency, 1890-1924, 12 SOC. SCI. 
HISTORY 377, 385 (1988). 
 122. Limitations on Congressional Power, supra note 106, at 940. 
 123. Id. at 940–41. 
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The Public Health Service attempted to provide national standards 
for “constitutional psychopathic inferiority,” but the broad categories left 
ample room for unchecked discretion and abuse by both state and federal 
medical officials. 
State officials desired to rid themselves of “undesirable” non-citizens 
housed in state institutions.  The solution was to deport these 
undesirables.  In 1926, for example, 796 persons were deported for 
“insanity” or “epilepsy,” 257 for “other mental conditions,” and 887 as 
“likely to become a public charge,” out of nearly 11,000 total 
deportations that year.124  Similar categorical deportation numbers 
occurred in 1930.125  In later decades the bases for deportation are not 
categorized, but we know the practice continued because of cases like 
that of Mrs. Leon.126 
This brief history provides some illustration of the link between 
becoming a “public charge” and the social control of the “undesirable” 
immigrant.  There was little if any change over time in the views of 
federal lawmakers.  Congress feared that a liberal immigration policy 
encouraged other nations to export their own undesirable citizens.  
Congress also made possible reciprocal “dumping” by the United States.  
Persons with mental illness or disability were the prime targets of this 
form of foreign policy.  A later era would experience this first-hand.  In 
the early 1980s, Cuba sent nearly 125,000 residents to the U.S., including 
an allegedly large number of convicts and mentally ill individuals, and 
refused to take them back.127 
C.  Landmarks in Congressional Debate: Reciprocal “Dumping” as 
Foreign Policy 
On two notable occasions in the past, Congress has focused 
specifically on mental health exclusions of immigrants.  First, in 1911, 
Congress intensively studied the U.S. immigration system through a 
series of commissioned reports, with an important focus on excluding the 
“undesirable” immigrant.  Then, prior to the major overhaul of the 
immigration system in the McCarren-Walter Act of 1952, Congress 
                                                          
 124. JANE PERRY CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE 14 
(1968). 
 125. Id.  In 1930, 509 persons were deported for “Insanity, epilepsy,” 221 for “other mental 
conditions,” and 305 as “likely to become a public charge.”  Id. 
 126. See supra notes 106–115 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Maria V. Morris, The Exit Fiction: Unconstitutional Indefinite Detention of Deportable 
Aliens, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 255, 297 (2001). 
942 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
produced an extensive legislative history, revisiting many of the issues of 
the 1911 study.  In both instances, screening for the mental health of 
immigrants received specific attention.  Both also reflect the prevailing 
belief that other nations were “exporting” mentally ill and disabled 
persons to the United States.  State and local governments bore this 
burden, resulting in significant pressure on the federal government to 
accommodate their interests. 
1.  The Dillingham Commission 
In 1907, Congress commissioned what became known as the 
Dillingham Commission, named after its chairman, Senator William 
Dillingham, to study the subject of immigration.128  At that time, around 
one million immigrants per year, mostly from Southern and Eastern 
Europe, entered the United States through Ellis Island.129  The reports of 
the joint House-Senate commission, published in 42 volumes, contrasted 
old world and new world immigration, a subject that was the focus of 
eugenic concerns.130  Among other proposals, the Commission 
recommended literacy tests and racial quotas geared towards reducing 
the number of undesirable entrants.131  Congress adopted many of the 
Commission’s recommendations in 1917.132  These new immigrants were 
more readily viewed as “undesirable,” compared to prior immigrants 
from northern Europe.133 
The Commission’s work had a significant influence on subsequent 
legislation: 
                                                          
 128. See Rachel Silber, Note, Eugenics, Family & Immigration Law in the 1920’s, 11 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 859, 867–68 (1997) (describing work of the Dillingham Commission). 
 129. See U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION: 
STATISTICAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION 1820–1910, S. DOC. NO. 756, at 4 (3d Sess. 1911). 
 130. See JEANNE D. PETIT, THE MEN AND WOMEN WE WANT: GENDER, RACE, AND THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA LITERACY TEST DEBATE 6–7 (2010); Silber, supra note 128, at 867; Martin S. 
Pernick, Eugenics and Public Health in American History, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1767, 1767 
(1997); John M. Lund, Boundaries of Restriction: The Dillingham Commission, 6 U. VT. HIST. REV. 
(Dec. 1994), available at http://www.uvm.edu/~ hag/histreview/vol6/lund.html; A. J. McLaughlin, 
Immigration and the Public Health, 29 PUB. HEALTH PAPERS & REP. 224, 224 (1903), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2222384/pdf/pubhealthpap00008-0229.pdf (“With 
the change in the racial character of immigration, most marked in the past decade, a pronounced 
deterioration in the general physique of the immigrants, and a much higher percentage of loathsome 
and dangerous diseases is noticeable.”).  
 131. Richard A. Boswell, Crafting an Amnesty with Traditional Tools: Registration and 
Cancellation, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 180 n.23, 182 (2010). 
 132. Id. at 180–82. 
 133. Anna O. Law, Race, Ethnicity, and National Origins in Public Policy—When Should It 
Matter?, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 71, 73 (1996). 
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The commission’s overall findings provided the rationale for the 
politically and economically inspired immigration restriction acts of the 
1920s, including the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, which favored 
immigration from northern and western Europe by restricting the 
annual number of immigrants from any given country to 3 percent of 
the total number of people from that country living in the United States 
in 1910.  The movement for immigration restriction that the Dillingham 
Commission helped to stimulate culminated in the National Origins 
Formula of 1929, which capped national immigration at 150,000 
annually and barred Asian immigration altogether.134 
Volume Two of the reports included the topic, “Immigration and 
Insanity.”135  It began with an overview of prior and current legislation 
on the subject: 
Foreign-born persons of unsound mind have been excluded from the 
United States by federal legislation since 1882.  The law of 1882 
prohibited the immigration of idiots and lunatics, and that of 1891 
excluded idiots and insane persons.  The statutes since enacted have 
been more comprehensive in their terms.  In 1903 a law was passed 
prohibiting the immigration of idiots, insane persons, persons insane 
within five years of the date of application for admission, and persons 
having had two or more previous attacks of insanity.  The law of 1907 
excludes idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, persons insane 
within five years of the date of application for admission, persons 
having had two or more previous attacks of insanity, and persons 
suffering from mental defects, not otherwise specified, sufficiently 
serious to affect ability to earn a living.136 
The report noted that under these statutes, “many aliens have been 
excluded,” and warned of a “very marked increase in the number of 
persons prevented, by reason of mental diseases, from entering the 
United States.”137  The report also provided a statistical breakdown of 
immigrant exclusions or deportations since 1890, divided into six 
categories: “Lunatics,” “Insane,” “Idiots,” “Idiots and insane,” 
“Imbeciles,” and “Feeble-minded.”138 
The commission claimed that despite efforts of immigration officials, 
there were “at the present time a large number of mentally unsound 
                                                          
 134. Dillingham Commission (1907–1910), HARV. U. LIBR. OPEN COLLECTIONS PROGRAM, 
http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/immigration/dillingham.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
 135. U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION: ABSTRACTS OF 
REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, VOL. II, S. DOC. NO. 747, at 223 (3d Sess. 1911).  
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944 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
aliens” residing in the United States.139  Of special note were non-citizens 
confined in state asylums and charity hospitals, classified both by race 
and country of birth.140  Of these, the report states, “it is evident that the 
foreign born continue to furnish much more than their proportionate 
share of insane.”141 
For the possible causes of “high ratios of insanity among the foreign-
born,” the report identified the primary cause to be inefficiency of federal 
immigration enforcement: 
As has been stated, the immigration of mentally unsound aliens is 
prohibited by law.  Any failure in the enforcement of this law would of 
course tend to result in the admission to the United States of mentally 
diseased persons and in a corresponding increase in the number of 
foreign-born insane in the country.  On the other hand, racial traits or 
tendencies, as shown by the ratios of insanity in the countries from 
which the immigrants came, may be responsible, to a certain extent, for 
the relative prevalence of insanity among the foreign-born population 
of the United States.  It is possible also that the tendency to insanity 
among the immigrants of the different nationalities is increased by the 
change in environment occasioned by immigration.142 
Not surprisingly, the Commission’s recommendations did not 
propose any change to the statutory exclusions, but said that more 
effective methods of screening were needed: “[T]he enforcement of such 
provisions is doubtless as satisfactory as can be expected in view of 
conditions under which arriving immigrants must be inspected.”143 
Ultimately, Congress adopted the following language in 1917: 
That the following classes of aliens shall be excluded from admission 
into the United States: All idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, 
epileptics, insane persons; persons who have had one or more attacks of 
insanity at any time previously; persons of constitutional psychopathic 
inferiority; persons with chronic alcoholism; paupers; professional 
beggars; vagrants; persons afflicted with tuberculosis in any form or 
with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease; persons not 
comprehended within any of the foregoing excluded classes who are 
found to be and are certified by the examining surgeon as being 
                                                          
 139. Id. at 229. 
 140. See id. at 230–33. 
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2015] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 945 
mentally or physically defective, such physical defect being of a nature 
which may affect the ability of such alien to earn a living . . . .144 
The reports of the Dillingham Commission both reflected and set the 
tone for debate in Congress concerning the “undesirable” immigrant with 
mental illness.145  Forty years later, Congress took another close look at 
mentally disabled immigrants. 
2.  Legislative History of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration Act 
Beginning in 1950, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary conducted a comprehensive study of the immigration laws, 
much like the Dillingham Commission had done four decades earlier.  
Many of the concerns presented in the Dillingham report also appear in 
the 1950 report that served as the foundation for the McCarran-Walter 
Act of 1952.146  That legislation, The Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952, has been amended in parts but is the primary law of immigration 
for the United States.147 
In general, the classes of undesirable aliens retained in the bill were 
made more definite, including medical grounds for exclusion.  The 1917 
Act, as we have seen, excluded “persons of constitutional psychopathic 
inferiority.”148  The 1952 Act modified the 1917 Act’s provisions to 
exclude “[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy or a 
mental defect.”149 
                                                          
 144. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 875 (1917) (emphasis added), available at 
http://library.uwb.edu/guides/usimmigration/39%20stat%20874.pdf. 
 145. Compare the following excerpt from a Senate report on the proposed Immigration Act of 
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 147. The Immigration and Nationality Act is codified under Title 8 of the United States Code, 8 
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A committee report states that those grounds were re-examined 
based upon information provided by the Public Health Service.150  The 
Surgeon General wrote: 
Members of the committee are undoubtedly aware of the difficulties 
under which the medical examination of aliens is performed.  
Occasionally, applicants attempt to conceal from the examining 
physician evidence which might result in their exclusion from the 
United States.  From time to time we hear of a visa applicant with a 
medical disability who has undergone treatment and received 
instructions from a private physician to help conceal the disability from 
the examining medical officer.  Under these circumstances it may be 
difficult, or even impossible, to detect mental conditions such as 
psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or drug addiction.  In 
connection with your committee work in redrafting the medical aspects 
of the Immigration Act, the enclosed Manual for Medical Examination 
of Aliens and the medical examination form may be of interest.151 
Other Congressional reports focused specifically on the language 
used for mental health exclusions.  The Public Health Service 
contributed a lengthy report in which it recommended the exclusion of 
one term: 
The use of the expression “feeble-mindedness,” unless intended to be 
all-inclusive, is inappropriate.  Feeble-mindedness is an inclusive 
generic term represented by subclasses of idiots, imbeciles, morons, 
and borderline intelligence.  Any degree of feeble-mindedness falls 
within the specific subclasses of idiocy, imbecility, moron, and 
borderline intelligence.  There is no point in retaining the inclusive 
generic term “feeble-minded.”  It should be deleted from the language 
of the bill and replaced by the definitive terms just listed.  It is 
suggested that a more appropriate wording would be as follows: 
“Aliens who are idiots, imbeciles, or morons.”152 
The most controversial term, as it would emerge, was the 
substitution of “psychopathic personality” for “constitutional 
psychopathic inferiority”: 
Although the term “psychopathic personality” used in classifying 
certain types of mental disorders, is vague and indefinite, no more 
appropriate expression can be suggested at this time.  The conditions 
                                                          
 150. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1698–99. 
 151. Id. at 1699. 
 152. Id. at 1700 (citing to Report of The Public Health Service on the Medical Aspects of H.R. 
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classified within the group of psychopathic personalities are, in effect, 
disorders of the personality.  They are characterized by developmental 
defects or pathological trends in the personality structure manifest by 
lifelong patterns of action or behavior, rather than by mental or 
emotional symptoms. . . . Until a more definitive expression can be 
devised, the term “psychopathic personality” should be retained.153 
A few years after enactment, an article in the Yale Law Journal 
attacked the new standards for determining mental incompetency 
introduced by the Act: 
The McCarran Immigration Act’s provision for the deportation of 
aliens who were excludable at time of entry as “persons afflicted with 
psychopathic personality” permits administrative expulsions under an 
indefinite standard to which the courts have added scant precision.  As 
a result, unpredictable and largely uncontrolled deportations effecting 
“delayed exclusion” may occur at the order of immigration hearing 
officers.154 
The U.S. Supreme Court drew extensively on this legislative history 
when it held in Boutilier v. Immigration and Nationalization Service that 
an alien who was a homosexual was “afflicted with psychopathic 
personality” within the terms of the 1952 Act, and thus was excluded 
from admission.155  This case became a flashpoint of debate concerning 
the treatment of homosexuals, a debate that extended to subsequent 
exclusions based on HIV status.156  As one scholar noted, “The exclusion 
of homosexuals has been, by far, the most controversial application of 
the mental defect and disability exclusion.”157  A perfect illustration, if 
one were needed, of why it is hazardous to view “mental illness” as a 
fixed set of conditions. 
The case was based upon an affidavit submitted by the Public Health 
Service stating that in the opinion of the diagnosing physicians, the 
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“petitioner was afflicted with a class A condition, namely, ‘psychopathic 
personality, sexual deviate’ at the time of his admission.”158 
The Court recounted the legislative history of the 1952 Act to 
support its conclusion that a homosexual could be classified as having a 
“psychopathic personality.”  The passage is worth quoting at length: 
The resulting legislation was first introduced as S. 3455 and used the 
new phrase “psychopathic personality.”  The bill, however, contained 
an additional clause providing for the exclusion of aliens “who are 
homosexuals or sex perverts.”  As the legislation progressed . . . 
however, it omitted the latter clause “who are homosexuals or sex 
perverts” and used only the phrase “psychopathic personality.”159 
How is the omission explained?  The Court relied on a brief 
paragraph in the Judiciary Committee’s report: 
The provisio(n) of S. 716 (one of the earlier bills not enacted) which 
specifically excluded homosexuals and sex perverts as a separate 
excludable class does not appear in the instant bill.  The Public Health 
Service has advised that the provision for the exclusion of aliens 
afflicted with psychopathic personality or a mental defect which 
appears in the instant bill is sufficiently broad to provide for the 
exclusion of homosexuals and sex perverts.  This change of 
nomenclature is not to be construed in any way as modifying the intent 
to exclude all aliens who are sexual deviates.160 
The Court noted that the meaning of the term was hotly disputed 
among the medical community: “It may be, as some claim, that 
‘psychopathic personality’ is a medically ambiguous term, including 
several separate and distinct afflictions.  But the test here is what the 
Congress intended, not what differing psychiatrists may think.”161 
A dissenting opinion believed the term to be hopelessly ambiguous: 
“The term ‘psychopathic personality’ is a treacherous one like 
‘communist’ or in an earlier day ‘Bolshevik.’  A label of this kind when 
freely used may mean only an unpopular person.  It is much too vague by 
constitutional standards for the imposition of penalties or punishment.”162 
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The equation of homosexuality with mental illness overshadows the 
general categorical exclusion, at least in recent scholarship.  What was 
the role of the Public Health Service more broadly, in advising Congress 
on mental conditions and disabilities?  As noted above, the Public Health 
Service suggested how they would interpret the proposed statutory 
language in the 1952 Act when evaluating immigrants applying for 
admission.  But if the Public Health Service’s proposed categories were 
insufficiently broad, it also suggested that a “catch-all” provision of 
mental defect would provide ample administrative discretion to exclude 
undesirable immigrants: 
The term “mental defect,” although broad and sweeping, is a safeguard 
for classifying those aliens who would not fit into the categories listed 
above.  For example, there is a fairly large group of hereditary 
disturbances which at the time of examination could not be included in 
the above classification. . . . Such a term could also be used to cover the 
more severely disabling neuroses and conduct and habit disorders of 
adults and children.  It can be used in classifying those persons who are 
likely to be brought into repeated conflict with social customs, 
authority, or society in general.  It is, therefore, recommended that the 
expression “as having a mental defect” be retained within the language 
of the bill.163 
On the specific issue of homosexuality as “psychopathic,” in 1979 
the Surgeon General announced that homosexuality would no longer be 
considered a mental disease or defect.  As a result, the Surgeon General 
“advised INS officers to stop referring aliens to the PHS for mental 
examinations solely to determine whether they were homosexuals.”164 
Thus, political control of the Public Health Service has been a long-
standing feature of its role in certifying non-citizens for admission.  This 
political control, in turn, derives from what the modern federal courts 
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interpersonal relations.  (13) Fantastic and uninviting behavior with drink and sometimes 
without.  (14) Suicide rarely carried out.  (15) Sex life impersonal, trivial and poorly 
integrated.  (16) Failure to follow any life plan.  
Id. at 125–26 (citing HERVEY M. CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY: AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY 
SOME ISSUES ABOUT THE SO-CALLED PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY 238–55 (1941)). 
 163. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1701. 
 164. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1444 (5th Cir. 1983). 
950 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
still recite: “Congress has unbounded power to exclude aliens from 
admission to the United States.”165 
What is the situation today?  U.S. immigration law authorizes the 
exclusion of persons with “a mental disorder” if there is some reason to 
believe that an individual may pose a threat to public safety.  Whether or 
to what extent this ground of exclusion is used today is difficult to 
discern.  Neither the Public Health Service nor U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services release data for persons excluded on the basis of a 
mental disorder.  Other grounds of exclusion can be invoked instead—
for example, that an immigrant is likely to become a public charge, is a 
past drug user or alcoholic, or has a history of encounters with law 
enforcement or criminal incidents.166  Moreover, U.S. consular officers 
have essentially unreviewable discretion to issue visas.167  The lengthy 
process for a Green Card, for example, requires an in-person interview, a 
background check, and written answers to questions including: 
“Have you ever been declared legally incompetent, or been confined to 
a mental institution?” 
“Have you ever been placed in . . . a rehabilitative program?” 
“Have you ever . . . been a habitual drunkard?”168 
While we do not know the extent to which immigration officials 
today exclude non-citizens on mental health grounds, Congress has 
maintained exclusions for mental illness even while it has eased nearly 
all restrictions based on physical disability. 
                                                          
 165. Fernandez v. U.S. Immigration Dep’t, No. 3:01-CV-0318-L, 2001 WL 460863, at *2 (N.D. 
Tex. Apr. 30, 2001) (citing In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1442), report and recommendation adopted, 
No. CIV. A. 301CV0318L, 2001 WL 609742 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2001). 
 166. These excludable grounds are found in I.N.A. § 212 and 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012).  In 
addition, an applicant for naturalization must show “good moral character.”  According to 
the USCIS Policy Manual, good moral character is defined as “character which measures up to the 
standards of average citizens of the community in which the applicant resides.”  U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, Policy Manual, v. 12, ch. 1, http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/ 
HTML/PolicyManual-Volume12-PartF-Chapter1.html (last visited May 25, 2015). 
 167. In October 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a case challenging the doctrine of 
consular non-reviewability—the availability of federal court review of visa denials.  Din v. Kerry, 
718 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014) (granting petition for writ of 
certiorari with No. 13-1402). 
 168. See Application for Naturalization, Form N-400, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS., at 13, 15, 16, available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/n-400.pdf. 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
With established interests to protect, the United States along with 
every other nation imposes constraints on citizenship and migration by 
self-selection.  What I have shown here is that the screen of “health 
security” is used to cover policy choices—whether to assume the risk of 
successfully managing contagious disease; whether to assume the burden 
of managing mental illness—that have shaped immigration policy for 
more than a century.  The foremost difference is that contagious disease 
presents a verifiable condition, where mental illness has been defined in 
such hazy terms as to be applicable to just about anyone—or at least, as 
Justice Douglas argued, anyone “unpopular.”169 
Excluding immigrants on health grounds is problematic, especially if 
the health condition can be cured or the potential of spreading it to others 
can be minimized or eliminated.  Exclusion based on mental conditions 
and disability can also be accommodated, but mental illness bleeds into 
fear of the criminal element as well as the public charge concern if a 
person is unable to work for self-support.  A related concern is that 
excluding classes of migrants that are considered undesirable becomes a 
matter of foreign policy.  As I have shown, the United States has at times 
viewed its health-based exclusions to be defensive in nature, warding off 
intentional export of undesirables by other countries.  Whether or to what 
extent U.S. deportation practices have accomplished the same result is 
not explored here. 
Can we envision a set of future circumstances in which an 
underdeveloped country suffering an epidemic will try to offload its 
patients on the United States or another developed country because of the 
treatment facilities available?  Or the incident described earlier of the 
Mariel boatlift, in which a country attempts to export its undesirable 
citizens, including those with mental illness or disabilities?  If so, we 
need to consider the obstacles, or the best avenues, for development of 
multi-national policy that can focus more on treatment and less on 
nationalistic “health security.”  Especially with mental health exclusions, 
is it possible to develop standards for dealing with mental illness that are 
comparable to standards regarding contagion?  Although contagious 
disease and mental illness are substantially different, they share the same 
                                                          
 169. As Justice Douglas wrote in his dissent in Boutillier, “A label of this kind when freely used 
may mean only an unpopular person.”  Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 
118, 125 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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primary hurdle, which is the effort to appeal to humane consideration 
rather than the fear of the imperfectly-known. 
 
